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The modern nation-forming process in Europe followed two 
typologically different paths. This contribution will deal with just 
one of these, namely that taken by non-dominant ethnic groups, 
the one which constituted organized and deliberate efforts at 
achieving the status of a fully developed nation, in all its 
attributes. This process is illustrated by comparison with the 
contrasting, more important and better known type of 
nation-forming process, which was based on the state-nation 
that had been developing since the Middle Ages1.
1 On the general concept of the nation-forming process, see: M. HROCH, 
'From National Movement to the Fully-formed Nation. The 





























































































I prefer to use the term national movement to characterize these 
projects rather than the nebulous and misleading term of 
"nationalism". The 'missing attributes' of a full national existence 
consisted of three features: a national literary language and 
culture, political autonomy (or in some cases, independence), and 
a social position equal with the ruling nation in terms of social 
structure and the division of wealth.
Three distinctive groups of goals and demands, corresponding to 
these three 'deficits', can be identified in the programme of 
European national movements:
1. —The creation of a national community, which would be
equal to the ruling one, and which would also include a 
completed social structure (i.e. a structure sufficient for the 
creation of its "own" ruling classes);
2. —The achievement of some kind of self-administration,
initially in the form of local or territorial autonomy, and 
ultimately (but not everywhere) the realization of 
independence;
3. —The improvement—or even the establishment—of a
national high culture based on the written national 
language, and the use of that language within the territory 
inhabited (or claimed) by the members of the non-dominant 
ethnic group.
There are of course some transitional cases, where completion of 
a full national existence was marked by only two missing 
attributes, and where the national programme was limited to just 
two groups of demands. To give one example: the Magyar 
national movement developed under the conditions of a full 
social structure, corresponding to a given stage of economic 
development.
Certain other irregularities and differences have to be taken into 
account, above all the very different timing of the groups of 
demands made by the various national movements. We also have 




























































































or political demands during the different phases of national 
movements:
Phase A where a small group of intellectuals devoted them­
selves to scholarly enquiry into the language, history, 
traditional culture and so on, of the non-dominant 
ethnic group;
Phase B where a new range of activists emerged, who now 
began to agitate for their compatriots to join the 
project of creating a fully-fledged nation;
Phase C where a majority of the population responded to the 
patriotic call and formed a mass movement; during 
this Phase C, the full social structure of the nation 
would usually come into being, and political 
differentiation begin to emerge.
In examining the strength of the linguistic and political 
programme produced during the 'B Phase' of different national 
movements, we can distinguish two types:
1) National movements where political demands dominated 
Phase B, accompanied by weaker and /  or later developed lin­
guistic and social demands, as was the case in the Polish, 
Norwegian, Irish, Greek and Scottish national movements;
2) National movements dominated by linguistic and cultural de­
mands during their Phase B, with political demands following 
later, during Phase C. This was true of almost all national move­
ments, except those belonging to the first type.
Even if a significant majority of national movements preferred to 
make linguistic demands in their Phase B, they did not define 
themselves exclusively in terms of a common language. They did 
not prioritise the linguistic argument because it was the only goal 
of which they could conceive, but because they regarded these 
demands as the most urgent.
This paper does not pretend to explain the nation-forming 




























































































Its aims are instead limited to an interpretation of the demands 
and programmes elaborated by the protagonists within the 
national movements, and most attention will be given to 
linguistic demands, their structure and the role played by them in 
the nation-forming process.
* * *
When trying to explain and interpret the extraordinarily 
important role played by language in so many different national 
movements, it is first of all necessary to remember that language 
was not something that existed "outside" of time and space. We 
have to begin with a consideration of the chronological and 
territorial dimensions to the role played by language during the 
centuries preceding the emergence of modern national 
movements in the 19th-century.
Too many current theories of "nationalism" ignore the fact that 
language difference had been perceived to be a criterion of 
diversity since the Early Middle Ages2. During the 9th and 10th 
centuries, the linguistic difference between "Franci" and 
"Germani" or "Teutoni" was more or less self-evident, and we 
know that conflicts occurred between groups and individuals 
based on differences in language. It is possible to find the term 
amor linguae, and mention of a laudatio for the popular tongue, 
or reflections on the role of the language, as for example, "ex 
Unguis gentes, non ex gentibus linguae exortae sunt"3. In this last
2 The best contributions on this problem have been published in 
Central Europe, and in Germany in particular; for bibliographical 
information, see: O. DANN (Hg.), Nationalismus in vorindustrieller 
Zeit, (München, 1986).
3 See: W. SCHLESINGER, 'Entstehung der Nationen' (p. 57 ff.), and 
K. H. REXROTH, 'Volkssprache und werdendes Volksbewusstsein im 
Ostfrankische Reich', (p. 296 ff.), in: H. BEUMANN and W. SCHRODER,




























































































instance, the inspiration of the "Tower of Babel" is clearly 
evident4.
The linguistic argument was used in politics, even though not as a 
central one, and many examples of this happening can be seen in 
both the West (France, Flanders, Wales, and England), and the 
East (Poland, Bohemia, Hungary)5. During the Middle Ages, 
language became important as a component of identity, but the 
primary criterion was that relating to the state and its political 
institutions, such as the Diet6.
The emergence of the absolutist state constitutes the territorial 
dimension to the prehistory of our problem. We can observe 
absolutist policy—in so far as it deals with questions of 
language—in two different ways: from above (from the 
perspective of the state and its government), and from below 
(from the perspective of the region, the provincial elites or even, 
of all its inhabitants).
The absolutist principle of homogenization sooner or later 
involved issues of language. From the perspective of an absolutist 
state and its ruling elites, it was irrelevant whether or not the 
linguistic homogenization of a territory, which they regarded as 
being on the periphery of the state, concerned dialects of 
languages spoken in other states, dialects of the ruling 
state-language, or even regions with a tradition of their own 
literary, printed language.
N ationes. A spekte der N ationenbildung im M itte la lter , 
(Siegmaringen, 1978).
4 A. BORST, Der Turm von Babel: Geschichte der Meinungen [1.-4.], 
(Stuttgart, 1957-63).
5 E. LEMBERG, Nationalismus I., (Hamburg, 1964);-J. ARMSTRONG, 
Nations before Nationalism, (Chapel Hill, 1982);-A. D. SMITH, The 
Ethnic Origins o f Nations, (Oxford, 1986).




























































































Historians cannot pretend to solve the problem of identifying the 
boundaries separating high languages from dialects, nor those 
between dialects belonging to different high languages, during 
the centuries preceding the emergence of linguistic codification. 
However, it can be provisionally suggested that the use of a 
"print-language" (B. Anderson) within the territory of an 
absolutist state seems to be a sufficient criterion for distinguishing 
the written language from dialects, patois and so on7. It is 
significant that medieval literary languages which did not become 
state-languages (or which lost that status) disappeared, or 
became marginalized during the period of absolutist rule (as was 
the case with Norwegian, Catalan, Czech and Welsh).
The cleavage between rural speech and the norms of the 
nationally accepted, 'high' written language used by the power 
elites was interpreted by enlightened aristocrats as being 
indicative of the degeneracy of the "vulgar" speakers. Dialects 
were sometimes used for the amusement of the elites, who were 
"marking their superiority over the lower classes"8. This attitude 
partially changed during the 'Age of Revolution' and was 
reversed during the 19th-century, when patriots turned dialects 
into objects for admiration.
Generally, the Revolutions took over the homogenizing attitude 
of the absolutist state, as is indicated by the campaign against 
patois during the French Revolution and the stance of the 
German Left towards Slavic languages during the Revolutions of 
1848-49. Nevertheless, two important differences suggest that the 
times were changing radically:
1) Absolutist attitudes were based on the concept of a homo­
geneous state, whereas revolutionary politics were based on the 
concept of the nation as an organic body, usually incarnated in the
7 B. ANDERSON, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins 
and Spread of Nationalism, (London, rev. ed., 1991), p. 45.




























































































state: this 'personality-nation' should only use one language, 
because the use of any other language would weaken the state.
2) Revolutionary homogenization did not aim to preserve old 
mentalities and traditional values, but on the contrary, the use of 
a unified language was regarded as an instrument for the 
"reproduction de I'homme nouveau" and as a "reformation des 
structures mentales"9.
This perspective 'from above' needs to be completed by a 
consideration of the perspective from below, i.e. from the 
periphery. Homogenizing state policy affected many areas of life 
on the periphery, and its linguistic aspect was only one of many, 
and perhaps not the most important. Absolutist, centralist 
measures provoked opposition and discontent in almost all 
provinces, but the strength and success of this opposition was not 
the same everywhere10, and the arguments used by provincial 
representatives against centralism were also quite different. It 
would in fact be an exciting task for future research to make a 
comparative analysis of responses by the peripheral nobility and 
bourgeoisie to the centralist challenge. Given the current state of 
research in this area, we can only present here a few examples to 
illustrate the extreme diversity of reactions.
The centralist policy of the Prussian state did not meet with any 
significant opposition amongst the Sorbian population in Lusatia, 
or on the part of Polish speakers in Upper Silesia. The linguistic 
homogenization attempted by Joseph II, however, provoked a 
strong reaction from the Hungarian and Belgian Estates, and a 
moderate one from the Bohemian, with all of them partially
9 P. BOURDIEU, Ce que parler veut dire. L'économie des échanges 
linguistiques, (Paris, 1982), p. 31. The "linguistic terror" accompanied 
the political one, see: J.-Y. LARTICHAUX, 'Linguistic Politics During the 
French Revolution', Diogenes 97, 1977, p. 65 ff.
10 W. BLOOM, Personal Identity, National Identity, and International 




























































































expressing their opposition in linguistic terms. Russian centralism 
did not provoke any opposition amongst the population who 
spoke Ukrainian dialects, but on the other hand did produce a 
strong reaction in the Baltic Provinces, amongst local landlords 
and the German-speaking elites11.
When looking at the role of linguistic developments within the 
first, medieval stage of the nation-forming process, we can often 
distinguish two opposing trends: one tending towards an 
assimilation of ethnic groups, the other maintaining, and perhaps 
strengthening, ethnic diversity. The first, "Western" trend relates 
above all to France and England, and the second, "Eastern" one 
to the three Empires—Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman. Why 
were these Empires unable to assimilate their various 
populations? There are usually two basic answers to this 
question: it is argued that firstly, whilst the nation-state was able 
to assimilate marginal ethnic groups, this was not true of the 
multi-ethnic Empires, and secondly, that the ruling elites in the 
Empires did not try hard enough to assimilate and homogenize 
the population.
Neither answer is incorrect, but they are unable to fully explain 
the general phenomenon. We also have to look for more profound 
reasons, which can be found in five groups of factors:
1) The level o f economic integration and economic growth 
during the Early Modern period was higher in France, England 
and the Netherlands than in the rest of the continent. It was only 
economic growth that enabled people from the periphery to 
achieve a higher level of prosperity, by migration into the core 
area and assimilation.
11 Originally, they argued in the name of the regional identity of the 





























































































2) Uneven economic development also influenced the level of 
social communication: in the more advanced countries, communi­
cation functioned at a higher level, and the ruling state language 
was the dominant language of communication, as it constituted 
the language of 'progress'.
3) The comparatively uneven level of administration in the 
Western, and Eastern absolutist systems.
4) Assimilation was more effective where the ruling elites did not 
use ethnic difference as a social barrier. There was no effective 
assimilation in societies where ethnic groups were strongly 
marginalized and isolated as an 'out-group' by the ruling elite 
{e.g., in the Ottoman Empire, or Baltic states).
5) The importance o f time cannot be neglected: whereas the 
process of assimilation in the West had already begun within the 
feudal system, the Eastern Empires emerged much later, and thus 
their attempts at assimilating ethnic groups did too. In the 
Habsburg Empire, this process really only began during the 18th- 
century, and in Russia during the 19th-century, so the period 
available for assimilation was much shorter. This was none­
theless also a question of social formation, as well as chronology: 
assimilation had a better chance of success under feudal society, 
as it was more difficult to assimilate peasants after their 
liberation than it had been before.
The linguistic situation under Eastern late absolutism can be 
characterized as three types of diglossia without bilingualism 
(following the model of Joshua Fishman)12:
1.—Where elites spoke a high version ("H"), and the general 
population spoke a local version ("L") of the same lan­
guage, the relationship can be described as "H - L";
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2. —Where elites spoke an "H"-language and the population
partly spoke an "L"-language, and partly a dialect belong­
ing to another language ("L*"), the relationship can be 
given as: "H - L - L*";
3. —Apart from the "H"-language, another print-language
("H+") was used within the territory of the state, which 
was obviously accompanied by a corresponding 
("L+")-language.
Even though the absolutist state neglected these differences, they 
determined the point of departure for the early stages of national 
movements and the structure of their programmes.
* * *
The above arguments have tried to suggest and illustrate to what 
extent national development—the nation-forming process—is a 
distinctively older phenomenon than the modern nation and na­
tionalism: any interpretation of modern national identity cannot 
ignore the peculiarities of pre-modern national development, or 
degrade it to the level of a mere myth.
The collective phenomena coming under the general heading of 
linguistic programmes cannot simply be analyzed as a 
homogeneous and unchanging complex of attitudes. In practice, 
they consisted of five stages, which emerged gradually and 
cumulatively, that is to say that the intensifying level of demands 
did not cancel out previous ones, but usually integrated them into 
the new programme, even if sometimes in a modified form. 
Unless we differentiate between these various levels and locate 
them within the concrete historical context of each national 
movement, any generalizations about the linguistic programmes 




























































































I.—In the first stage the language is celebrated and defended.
All kinds of arguments were used to support its claim to be 
accepted into the family of high languages—its aesthetic value, 
its ability to express all manner of feelings or convey information, 
its historical merits; but celebrations of this type were in no way 
specific to non-dominant ethnic groups. A "défense" of the 
French language was published in France in 1549 by the bishop 
Jean du Bellay13.
During the second half of the 18th-century, defences of the 
German, Magyar, Czech, Slovak and Greek languages appear­
ed. Chronologically later, but still coming during the same Phase 
A, nostalgic celebrations of the national language were written in 
Wales, Brittany and Flanders. All of these celebrations had one 
feature in common: they always concerned languages that had a 
Medieval or Early Modern tradition of literary activity.
During the emergence of Phase B, language celebrations turned 
into a fashionable form of agitation in almost all national 
movements, and from then on, language became a part of the 
national message. However, these celebrations had a different 
function from their former one, because they were primarily 
addressed towards their own ranks. Members of the 
non-dominant ethnic group were encouraged to love and defend 
their language—as one Czech dictum, published in 1824 in a 
translation from the German, put it: "Who does not love his 
language, is an enemy of his own fatherland".
Related to this shift in the audience for national agitation, it is 
necessary to include a general proviso. National demands were 
generally targeted in two opposite directions: (i) "upwards", 
towards the state administration, local authorities, educated
13 A. DUPRONT, 'Sémantique historique et analyse de contenu : culture 
et civilisation', in: M. CRANSTON and P. Ma ir  (eds.), Langage et 




























































































ruling elites, etc.; (ii) "downwards", towards their own peer 
group, trying to mobilize the members of the non-dominant ethnic 
group for participation in patriotic activities.
This dual perspective—from below and from above—was 
variable, and we have to take that into account when analyzing 
the structure of all the different types of national aims.
II.—The second stage: language planning and codification.
This was an intrinsic part of cultural standardization14. Before 
codification was achieved, the language existed both as a group 
of dialects and also as a "print-language", which already began 
to influence linguistic norms in the decades before the literary 
language was codified. These norms were based on the experi­
ence of the production of a print-language, and on the terms used 
in administration, trade relations, and public life. "Language 
planning" included a simultaneous process of linguistic organiza­
tion, popularization and standardization15—it would have been 
paradoxical to celebrate a vague complex of spoken dialects, 
without having a unified orthography or distinct language bor­
ders. But language planning was not just limited to cultural stan­
dardization: it also fulfilled an important social function and 
purpose. It was the only way of clearly distinguishing one's own 
national group, i.e. of drawing a clear and comprehensible border 
between the in-group and out-group, particularly where there 
was a fluid transition between related dialects16.
14 E. GELLNER, Culture, Identity and Politics, (Cambridge U.P., 1987), 
p. 24;-P. BOURDIEU, Ce que parler veut dire, p. 29.
15 J. A. FISHMAN, Language and Nationalism. Two Integrative Essays, 
(Rowley /  Mass., 1972), p. 61.
16 B. B. KHLEIF, 'Insiders, Outsiders and Renegades: Towards a
Classification of Ethnolinguistic Labels', in: H. GILES and
B. Sa in t -Ja c q u e s  (eds.), Language and Ethnic Relations, (Pergamon, 
1979), p. 159 ff.;-F. BARTH, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, (Bergen, 




























































































Learned linguistic disputes had emerged almost everywhere 
during Phase A, accompanied by the publication of grammar 
books and dictionaries, but the research of individual scholars 
was something altogether different from the evolution of a 
generally accepted codification. Voluntaristic decisions about 
codification and attempts to "create" a new literary language 
were usually unsuccessful. Codification was generally related to 
the previous development of linguistic norms and occurred as a 
result of long-term, and often very heated, scientific discussions. 
The central—but by no means the only—topic of discussion and 
controversy tended to be whether the modern language was to be 
based on its older, printed (literary) form or on the current spoken 
language17.
The timing of language standardization varied greatly and 
reflected the asynchronical character of national development in 
different parts of Europe. The Czech and Magyar languages 
were codified during the first decades of the 19th-century, whilst 
the codification of Slovak, Serbo-Croatian and Slovene came 
around the middle of the century. During the second half of the 
century, Finnish, Estonian and Latvian were codified, followed 
after 1900 by the Lithuanian and Ukrainian languages18.
This second stage in the linguistic programme was primarily 
directed towards the ethnic group itself, defined as an in-group, 
and offered a unified way of writing and speaking.
17 R. AUTY, 'The Linguistic Revival Among the Slavs of the Austrian 
Empire 1780-1850: the Role of Individuals in the Codification and 
Acceptance of New Literary Languages', Modern Language Review, 
UR, 1958, p. 392 ff.





























































































III.—The third stage: the intellectualization o f the national 
language.
This was closely connected to the earliest attempts at codification, 
and usually, worked against it—learned discussions on linguistic 
matters were unable to prevent the patriots concerned from 
improving their literary creativity, even though they were using 
different linguistic norms. As in the second stage, progress was 
rather asynchronical.
The development of literary creativity, as expressed in the evolu­
tion of different genres, occurred quite independently of this asyn­
chronical course, and its pattern can be summarized as fol­
lows: a) the earliest form of intellectualization was represented 
by journals and educational literature; b) poetry, and translations 
from foreign literatures—above all from that of the ruling na­
tion; c) the collection and imitation of folk-songs; d) the writing 
of theatre pieces; e) the writing of short stories or tales, which 
was the archetypal prose genre of Phase B, with novels being 
written more commonly during Phase C; f)  the language of sci­
entific literature tended to be the last to be improved, 'invented' 
or included in the national culture.
Some of the later national movements doubted if it was necessary 
to advance from the first sequence on to the higher ones, 
suggesting that the remainder could be filled in by translations. In 
one extreme example, a few national leaders in Russian Ukraine 
recommended—as late as 1905—using the newly codified literary 
language exclusively for the writing of educational literature, 
journals and light novels for popular consumption19.
In comparing national and regional identities, it could be asked at 
this point to what extent the model of genres outlined above
19 G. SHEVELOV, The Ukrainian Language in the First H alf o f the 
Twentieth Century (1900-1941): its State and Status, (Harvard U.P., 




























































































could also be used in the case of the development of regional 
cultures within the territory of larger national cultures.
IV.—The fourth stage: introducing the language into the schools.
The codified literary language could only fulfil its social mission 
once it had been mastered by the members of the non-dominant 
ethnic group—it had also to be "consumed" by them, even if 
under conditions unlike those of a "free market". Patriots 
developed several modes of transmitting the language, which 
differed according to local traditions and the level of social 
organization achieved during Phase B. These included popular 
song-festivals (as in Estonia, Wales or Latvia), different forms of 
dancing (as in the Czech, Magyar and Catalan cases), reading 
circles (almost everywhere), cafés and so on. Nevertheless, the 
most powerful instrument for language dissemination was 
undoubtedly the schools.
The central demand put forward at this stage was for the 
"nationalization" of schools20, which was directed both 
"upwards" towards the ruling state administration, and 
"downwards" towards members of the same ethnic group:
a) state-authorities were to permit and support schools 
where children would be instructed in their mother tongue, 
or—at the very least, and as a provisional compromise— 
where they could learn it;
b) where such schools existed, parents were asked to send 
their children for instruction in their mother tongue, rather 
than to schools where the ruling state-language was the 
means of instruction.
In this way, the struggle for national schools became an effective 
component within national mobilization during Phase B, though
20 E. BALIBAR and I. WALLERSTEIN, Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous 




























































































its effects went much deeper. Introducing the new language of 
instruction into school education was the only way of 
strengthening the ties which bound together the members of the 
nation-to-be. The importance of these schools thus exceeded that 
of supplying the needs of communication: through linguistic 
education, the school created a "communauté de conscience". 
The children not only learned the emerging literary language 
there, but also an ability to describe, observe and perceive reality 
in the same, or nearly the same, way21. From this point of view, 
an ambiguous situation was created in the school systems of the 
multi-ethnic states possessing one ruling nation, such as 
Germany or Russia. Both the ruling elites and the patriotic 
movements tried to use linguistic education in formulating their 
understanding of the world, society and national identity.
The results achieved during this stage of national demands 
depended on the attitude of the state administration to a greater 
extent than at previous stages. Some states, such as the Habsburg 
Empire or Sweden, permitted the use of local languages as the 
language of instruction in elementary schools even during the 
period before the emergence of Phase B. By contrast, other 
national movements were helpless against the all—powerful 
unilingual state education policy—this was true for Ukrainians 
and Lithuanians in Russia, or Slovaks in Hungary after 1870.
The fourth stage produced an important change in the character 
of the linguistic programme: it entered the field o f politics. The 
struggle for "national" schools continued into Phase C as well, 
and in so far as this occurred under constitutional conditions, it 
became a part of political disputes, and was discussed by political 
representatives at all levels.
21 G. Da vy , Éléments de sociologie, (Paris, 1950), p. 233;-P. BOURDIEU, Ce 
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V.—The fifth stage: the realisation o f the fu ll equality of 
languages.
The most advanced stage in the linguistic programme was 
achieved when national leaders asked for the introduction of 
their language into the administration, courts of justice, the 
postal system, the railways, trade and politics. If this stage was 
reached at all, it was achieved during Phase C, but the complexity 
and radicalism of demands, as well as their results, differed 
chronologically and spatially even more than in all the previous 
stages. The most successful example was the Magyar national 
movement in the Compromise of 1867, whilst the Czechs 
advanced to some degree of linguistic equality in the Czech­
speaking territories of Bohemia and Moravia, and similar results 
were achieved by the Croatians. In Russia, only the Finns were to 
achieve a degree of success, before the last wave of Russification 
at the end of the 19th-century. The Flemish in Belgium also 
achieved a measure of equality, but the majority of national 
movements remained unsuccessful during the fifth stage of 
linguistic demands.
In cases where the fifth stage was successful, two levels of 
demands can be observed, corresponding to two ways of 
interpreting linguistic equality. The first concerned the equal use 
of both the ruling state-language and the minority language 
within the ethnic territory of the emerging small nation. The 
second step formulated the demand that only the language of the 
local inhabitants should be permitted within the ethnic territory, 
limiting the use of the state-language to contacts between the 
provincial and central administration. Escalation of conflicts of 
this kind only occurred in a few cases: the Czechs, Croatians, 
Finns and even the Flemish, created a model which was later 
accepted by almost all national movements22.
22 The Magyar claims for a unilingual Hungary after 1867 illustrate the 
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The same question could also be posed the other way round: why 
did the ruling elites even try to defend the primacy of their 
language on the territory of the non-dominant ethnic group, 
where this language was neither used nor known? The crucial 
point was that the call for the equality of languages in 
administration and political life endangered the monopolistic 
position of the state elites in this area23.
Naturally, linguistic demands entered the field of politics during 
the fifth stage and were included in the political programmes of 
national movements, and furthermore, were also included within 
their social programmes. Sooner or later, the call for full 
linguistic equality turned into a struggle for positions in the 
administration. The newly-created Czech, Croatian and Finnish 
elites observed with growing indignation the continuing 
occupation of well-paid positions by elites belonging to the ruling 
state-nation. In these circumstances, the call for linguistic equality 
expressed much more than just national prestige or a symbolic 
value: it contributed to the emergence of a nationally significant 
conflict of interests. These kinds of conflicts were an intrinsic part 
of the nation-forming process, and have been analyzed in another 
context24.
* * *
23 One of the founders of the Czech political programme asked in 1848:
"What good will freedom of speech and the press bring us, if our 
language is henceforth to be excluded from administration and 
public life? This will once again put the ruling power into the 
hands of a small group of privileged individuals."





























































































The second part of this paper deals with the social interpretation 
of linguistic programmes. We may well regard all these linguistic 
quarrels as infantile, or be ironic about the "artificiality" of new 
languages, but we cannot ignore the political and social 
importance of this phenomenon, which requires an historical 
explanation. Any such explanation should keep in mind the long­
term historical dimension to the nation-forming process in 
Europe: was the correlation between the primacy of the linguistic 
programme and the development of the social structure of purely 
marginal significance?
As far back as the Middle Ages, language was accepted as an 
instrument of group solidarity, though not everywhere and only 
by a rather limited part of feudal society: either those who, 
a) were in power and could use language as an argument for 
their aims and goals, directed both at their neighbours and their 
own population; or b) occupied a particular place in the system of 
communication—priests and later, in certain circumstances, 
merchants and even craftsmen.
For the most part, the mass of the rural population accepted as 
part of their fate the linguistic rules of the game that came from 
above. Spontaneous changes in the spoken language were condi­
tioned by the need for survival, communication, or state interests, 
but this changed with the process of absolutist homogenization 
mentioned above. Opposition to homogenization only rarely used 
linguistic arguments, mainly in the Habsburg Empire. This op­
position had one feature in common: a social background formed 
by the nobility and part of the clergy, who were defending the 
remnants of medieval privileges. They originally used linguistic 
arguments as a cover for their more important particularist 
political and social interests. Only in Hungary—where this kind 
of aristocratic opposition immediately stimulated the emergence 
of Phase B—did the switch from the linguistic to a political pro­
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monarchy, the non-dominant ethnic groups accepted linguistic 
centralism with remarkably little resistance, e.g. Catalans under 
Bourbon absolutism, Norwegians under Danish rule, Ukrainians 
under both Russian and Habsburg rule, and so on. The social ex­
planation for this seems to be quite clear: all these ethnic groups 
lacked a cohesive elite that was interested in political opposition 
to absolutist homogenization.
As a result of this development, most of the European national 
movements started their Phase B later, in the situation of a (just 
recently introduced) linguistic homogeneity within the adminis­
tration of a state ruled by established elites, speaking and reading 
the state-language.
It is not the aim of this paper to explain why Phase B started, as 
this is a change which should be analyzed in all the complexity of 
its cultural, economic and socio-psychological context. Here, we 
can only outline some of its more important aspects. The emer­
gence of national agitation was connected to important processes 
of modernization, which produced feelings of social, intellectual, 
and sometimes even political and moral, crisis. These changes 
stimulated a need for some kind of new group solidarity and 
identity, and produced dissatisfaction among educated members 
of the non-dominant ethnic group, who were motivated in part by 
the impression that the linguistic homogenization introduced by 
the absolutist state brought no benefits to the group to which they 
belonged25. On the contrary: they did not participate in any 
upward social mobility from the periphery to the centre, and they 
noticed that the increasing contacts with the linguistically 
different administration were becoming ever more difficult. 
Under these circumstances, they accepted the idea of defining 
their nation-to-be primarily in terms of its language.




























































































We can see that—in certain circumstances—their linguistic 
demands were usually successful. Even if it occurred before a full 
consensus on codification had been achieved, once a literary 
language had become established, language—as an expression of 
national identity—could not be substituted by anything else (there 
is no empirical evidence of any such case). This became even less 
possible at a later stage, after the transition to Phase C, as 
language had by then become a spiritual possession belonging to 
the masses.
In analyzing this occurrence, we first have to compare the other 
options available to the patriotic movement, which might have 
constituted an alternative to the national language. Was it 
possible to form a new identity in another way, without creating 
a new national language? In a very few cases, there was an 
alternative: the Flemish could choose a Dutch identity, Slovaks a 
Czech one, whilst the Croatians, Slovenes and Serbs were 
encouraged to accept Illyrism—all without success. In all cases an 
alternative existed, that of accepting linguistic assimilation, 
without relinquishing the new national identity, though there 
appear to be only two examples of this choice actually being 
made—the Irish and the Scottish cases26. However, these are 
such singular instances, that we can regard them as exceptions, 
rather than as a model for other national developments. The 
Swiss case is also exceptional, and is often recommended as an 
ideal solution to national problems, but none of these exceptions 
can really be accepted as cogent alternative models.
We have to acknowledge the fact that in some circumstances, 
there was no alternative to the linguistic national programme. 
The most important factor is illustrated by the remarkable
26 The Irish case proves that there was no need for a new ”H"-language, 
when the attempt to create it starts in the situation of a successful 





























































































correlation between national movements prioritising linguistic 
demands during Phase B and the existence of an incomplete social 
structure within the non-dominant ethnic group, and this is 
something that needs interpretation.
After the literary language had become established, its acceptance 
or non-acceptance by the members of the nation-to-be became a 
matter of specific "market-relations". Here, it is necessary to ask 
who the audience for this message was, i.e. which social groups 
and classes were meant to become the "consumers" of the new 
literary language, as a particular form of commodity?27
Contemporary sociolinguists argue that changes in the usage of 
language (and the acceptance of a new literary language was a 
change of this type) can be interpreted as "the speaker's response 
to large-scale social processes"28. They also stress the need to 
take account of social conditions in research on shifts in language. 
Even if we follow this methodological approach, we still have to 
solve the central problem of how to explain the above-mentioned 
correlation between incomplete social structures and linguistic 
programmes during Phase B.
The problem cannot be solved simply by quoting J. G. Herder. 
Naturally, his arguments are often cited, but he was not some 
kind of "Eastern thinker"29 existing in isolation from the West. 
Nor should the importance of J.-J. Rousseau or German 
philosophers, such as Fichte or Schelling, be forgotten30. As an 
objection to these arguments, it can be asked why it was that the
27 P. BOURDIEU, Ce que parler veut dire, Chap. 1.
28 M. MARTIN-JONES, 'Language, Power and Linguistic Minorities: the 
Need for an Alternative Approach to Bilinguism, Language 
Maintenance and Shift', in: R. GROLLO (ed.), Social Anthropology and 
Politics o f Language, (London /  New York, 1989), p. 118.
29 There are parallel thinkers in the West as well, e.g. H. Wergeland in 
Norway during the 1830s, or T. Davies in Ireland during the 
1840s;-J. F is h m a n , Language and Nationalism, p. 48.




























































































middle classes should have been more attracted to their (usually 
rather complicated) formulations, than were the ruling elites of 
national movements possessing a full social structure31.
Another standard explanation emphasizes the influence o f 
romanticism. This can be partially accepted, in so far as it relates 
to the protagonists of those national movements in which 
Phase B started earlier, during the first half of the 19th-century. 
This relationship cannot, however, be interpreted simply as being 
the one-sided impact of romanticism; it was instead a coexistence 
based on common roots. Both romanticism and the search for a 
new national identity tried to respond to the great crisis of 
legitimacy and social change, which had been provoked by the 
dissolution of the old feudal society, with its stable and 
transparent ties32. The upholder of these new values—the 
nation—had to be defined by stable and unchangeable features: 
language came to be of unique importance, as a stable and easy 
way of defining such ties.
A new concept of the nation as a personalized body em erged, 
based on this very coexistence and interconnection, and this 
metaphor was soon transformed into a basic conception, whereby 
the ethnic group was internally defined as "us". When seen as a 
personality, the nation could therefore naturally only use one 
literary language, just as it could only incorporate one common 
past into its "memory". The life of this personality-nation and its 
dissimilarity and differentiation from other nations, logically de­
pended on the successful spread of the national language; if that 
failed, the personality-nation would "die". Being in fear of their 
nations' death provoked in the leaders of national movements
31 The explanatory capacity of K.W. Deutsch's model is also fairly 
limited: certainly, the growing importance of language is conditioned 
by more intense communication, but why were the lower and middle 
classes more strongly attracted to linguistic demands than the better 
educated elites?




























































































during Phase B feelings analogous to those of fear for the loss of a 
loved person, or even of their own death. In this line of reasoning, 
every enemy of the new national language logically became a 
potential "killer" of the nation, and incidentally, this sense of be­
ing in danger not only characterized national movements during 
Phase B, but formed one of their key stereotypes, sometimes right 
up to the present day.
The success of Phase B cannot be explained just by reference to the 
enthusiasm of the patriotic leaders, their mentalities and so on. It 
is necessary to take into account the ordinary members of the 
non-dominant ethnic group—the audience, whose decisions and 
behaviour played the crucial role in the nation-forming process. 
At this point, we do not need to ask why the patriotic leaders 
made linguistic demands, but why the "masses" accepted it.
Our point of departure is the growing need for communication, 
resulting from economic growth and the advance of innovations 
in the field of administration. With improving communication, a 
growing number of individuals became literate and receptive to 
the standardized presentation of information, and the volume 
and quality of language use was raised to a new level, in a similar 
way to what happened in school education.
However, it would be misleading to understand educational 
changes solely as an increase in literacy in its narrowest sense 
(knowledge of reading and writing). Oral education in the schools 
also attracted an increasing number of children aged ten years 
and over, the age when children can start to learn to think 
abstractly, not just in linguistic terms, but also in terms of an 
ability to understand phenomena such as the nation. Language 
could only take on the new qualities corresponding to the needs of 
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individuals" (G. Stokes)33. At the same time, it was only these 
operational personalities who were able to imagine large social 
groups or communities, such as the nation34, and understand that 
this group (as a personalized body) has similar needs, relation­
ships and a common consciousness with other members of the 
community35.
For the growing number of individuals who achieved this degree 
of education, literacy became their "real entrance-card to full 
citizenship and human dignity"36. Nevertheless, this "entrance- 
card" was accessible only to those whose mother-tongue 
corresponded to the state-language, the one which also played 
the dominant role in the education of operational individuals. 
Expressed in the sociolinguistic terms used above, rapid social 
change and the growing communication between "H"- and "L"- 
speakers made the diglossia dysfunctional. State institutions 
tended to make individuals monolingual in a language other than 
their mother-tongue, with the result that school children who 
spoke an "L*"-language at home increasingly became bilingual. 
For the first time, this new challenge produced an ambivalent 
response, which on the one hand accentuated the advantages of 
the newly-mastered state-language, and on the other, attempted 
to replace the "foreign" state-language with an "elaborated 
version" of their "own pre-industrial tongue"37.
33 G. STOKES, 'Cognition and the Function of Nationalism', Journal o f 
Interdisciplinary History, IV, 1974, p. 533 ff.
34 From this perspective, we can understand more easily the term 
"imagined communities", as used by B. Anderson.
35 H. W EILEN M A N , 'The Interlocking of Nation and Personality 
Structure', in: K. W. DEUTSCH and W. J. FOLTZ (eds.), Nation-Building 
(New York, 1966), p. 37 ff.
36 E. Ge l l n e r , Nations and Nationalism, (Oxford, 1983).
37 J. FISHMAN, Language in Sociocultural Change, p. 148;-The first trend 
was directed towards the monoethnic state, the second at two nations 




























































































The actual historical conditions were nevertheless not as 
harmonious as envisaged by Fishman's model. The "H"- and 
"L*"-languages were "not only separate but also unequal", and 
so the degree of freedom of choice for "L*"-speakers should not 
be over-emphasized38. It was unusual for all members of a 
non-dominant ethnic group to become bilingual. On the contrary, 
the majority did not, and had to communicate with authorities 
and individuals whose "H"-language was only partially 
understandable to them. Coming from an inferior social stratum 
and at the same time using an inferior "L*"-tongue, they ended 
up in the position of 'inferior human beings', with all the feelings 
of humiliation accompanying that situation. In such 
circumstances, language naturally played a specific role in their 
understanding of the world.
Again, we can imagine two responses to this situation: either they 
would feel ashamed of their inferior "L*"-tongue and try to 
adopt the superior "H"-language and assimilate, or they would 
feel a growing animosity towards the ruling "H"-speakers and be 
receptive to the call for a new literary language, corresponding or 
being fully understandable to their mother tongue.
However convincing this model may appear, there are two 
objections to it, which need answering:
1) The situation of linguistic inferiority described above had 
existed since the Middle Ages, without having caused any 
noticeable national mobilization amongst the mass of "L*"- 
speakers. So of what precisely did the difference consist? It had 
been part and parcel of the feudal system that individuals were 
unequal since from the moment of their birth; just as they were 
born serfs, so they were born as "L*"-speakers, and this was 
accepted as a given reality. The process of modernization 
contributed to the spread of a new concept of human dignity and



























































































- 2 9 -
equality, and at the same time, a growing number of the members 
of the non-dominant ethnic group achieved an elementary level 
of education and /  or became independent participants in a 
system of market relations. For these people, the medieval 
structure of unequal social relations was no longer self-evident.
2) Why would this unequal social situation come to include the 
need for the formation of a new ethnolinguistic, national identity? 
Why did assimilation fail as a solution? The alternative to 
assimilation was far from being dependent on individual 
decisions; access into the ranks o f the ruling nation was not 
automatic everywhere. As long as the number of individuals with 
a higher education increased, and exceeded the (limited) amount 
of "acceptable" individuals moving from the lower linguistic 
strata to the centre, they could not be absorbed into the state elite, 
even if they adopted the ruling state-language and changed their 
identity: they remained an out-group (the Irish are a good 
example of this). The national agitation of Phase B offered to the 
educated individuals among them the opportunity to create a new 
in-group based on a common language, all of whose members 
could be equal and hope for better opportunities for social 
advancement without having to assimilate39. This prospect was 
at least more appealing than that of remaining an assimilated 
periphery. Even if we take into consideration the fact that in 
many European states differences between centre and periphery 
strengthened regional identities, this was not usually the case 
where the differences between the periphery and state-elites 
were not only regional and social, but also linguistic.
* * *




























































































Using these observations on the effects of modernization, we can 
return to the question of the correlation between an incomplete 
social structure and the charisma of language. The explanation 
can be summarized into three points:
1) As modernization proceeded, vertical social mobility in­
creased, but did not create equal opportunities for all individuals. 
This was the case where the remnants of feudal conditions and 
mentalities impeded social advancement, even for those members 
of the non-dominant ethnic group who became bilingual: the 
more difficulties they had in moving from the lower to the higher 
classes, the more significant the association between the 
language they spoke and the social position they occupied40.
This relationship seemed to be less important where: a) the 
non-dominant ethnic group had a 'full' social structure, i.e. it 
possessed its own elites, and b) Phase B started under the 
conditions of developed capitalist society. In both these situations, 
difficulties in social advancement could scarcely be explained 
other than by social conditions.
2) Let us suppose that we are observing an advanced social 
situation which made vertical social mobility possible for 
everyone who managed to learn the state language. Becoming 
bilingual was nevertheless not just a matter of financing school 
education: it was also related to the individual's linguistic 
aptitude, which does not necessarily correspond to their 
intelligence quotient. In addition, it was connected to the 
intellectual level at which the mother-tongue was heard at home, 
as this was a precondition for any later ability to express abstract 
concepts. Even if their linguistic aptitude were the same, how­
ever, the results of linguistic instruction could differ according to
40 G. WILLIAMS, 'Language Group Allegiance and Ethnic Interaction', in: 




























































































- 3 1 -
the social environment from which children came41. Many his­
torical examples testify to this situation, as was observed by con­
temporaries during Phase B42.
3) An incomplete social structure also had its impact on political 
culture. The national agitators of Phase B came predominantly 
from the lower strata of the population and addressed their ap­
peals to the same strata. Whether this primarily related to small 
artisans and craftsmen, as in Bohemia, or farmers, as in 
Lithuania and Estonia, it always involved social groups and 
classes, who at the time Phase B emerged, possessed neither 
political experience nor political education; in fact, it was these 
very concerns that motivated patriotic leaders. The members of 
the non-dominant ethnic group needed to define group 
characteristics, which could be recognized in the easiest possible 
way43. They were hardly likely to become inspired by (or identified 
with) a programme of civil rights and political liberty. "Freedom" 
for a peasant meant freedom from feudal oppression, while 
freedom of speech, association and so on, remained an 
uninteresting idea44. Linguistic group-characteristics were 
basically closer and more understandable to the lower classes.
41 See, among others: G. H. MEAD, Mind, Self and Society, (Chicago, 
1934), p. 135 ff.; E. HAUGEN, 'Bilinguals Have More Fun', Journal o f 
English Linguistics, 19, 1986, p. 106 ff.; J. HERMANN, 'Bilingualism 
Versus Identity', Multilingual Matters, 43, 1988, p. 227 ff.
42 In a memorandum of 1832, leading Czech patriots argued that Czech­
speaking young men only attained a mechanical knowledge of 
subjects taught in schools where German was the (obligatory) 
language of instruction, and that their German was insufficient for 
better jobs or university studies. On the other hand they were unable 
to use their mother-tongue either, because they had not learnt its 
written form.
43 H. WEILENMAN, The Interlocking of Nation, p. 37.
44 Analyzing the semantics of the French Cahiers de doléances, 
A. DUPRONT demonstrates that the only form of "culture" familiar to 
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Recognizing these characteristics, the structure of the national 
programme implicitly accorded language the highest value, and 
passed this on to subsequent generations, even though they later 
earned a better political education, under changed conditions.
We have seen how linguistic demands became integrated into the 
political programme. Even during Phase C, this made them for 
several decades the most effective means of articulating different 
group conflicts within the advancing modern society, though this 
did not necessarily mean that in these conflicts, the language of 
the non-dominant ethnic group represented a "progressive" 
trend. Quite the reverse: it was sometimes used during Phase B as 
an anti-modern argument, expressing the fears of an old middle 
class (or part of it) that felt threatened by modern industrial 
development.
After analyzing the reasons for the priority of linguistic demands 
during Phase B, we have to ask why they retained such an 
important position in the national programme during Phase C as 
ivell, when the social structure of the national group was 
completed, and political experience became a part of everyday 
life. The answer to this question concerns the most striking social, 
political and socio-psychological peculiarities of national 
movements.
Unequal opportunities for social advancement did not disappear 
with the transition to Phase C. Even if the social structure of the 
new nation was sooner or later completed during this phase, the 
inferiority of the lower-middle classes did not disappear. During 
the preceding Phase B, these classes only became partially and 
gradually aware of the fact that their inferior social position was 
connected to differences in language, but this link was more fully 
experienced with national mass-mobilization. In other words, the 
inferiority of the non-dominant ethnic group, which had been 
identified by the patriotic leaders in Phase B as a disadvantage 
that was to be expected, changed during Phase C into a 
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the spread of linguistic demands, which were understood as a 
substitution for, or supplementation of, social ones.
As mentioned above, the linguistic programme entered the arena 
of politics during its fourth and fifth stages: it could be used as an 
argument in political disputes with the ruling state-elites, and 
also as an argument in the internal political disputes among the 
national leaders themselves. Anyone who intended to become a 
successful politician, had to support linguistic demands: to  
propose compromises or concessions with the ruling state-nation 
in linguistic matters was tantamount to political suicide. Under 
the conditions of political differentiation existing during Phase C, 
both liberals and clericals, and even agrarians and most socialists, 
included linguistic demands in their political programme. 
Nevertheless, this did not mean that linguistic demands 
determined the structure and dimension of all political goals.
We often find one new political aim that was closely linked to 
linguistic demands: a modified understanding of the equal rights 
of languages, which emerged during Phase C. National leaders 
defined the ethnic territory of their nation as a territory where 
their own language was to be the dominant one, a demand which 
seems in part to be a response by the lower middle classes to their 
experience of social disadvantage45. This demand obviously 
caused a sudden escalation of the political struggle, and it is 
precisely at this moment that it becomes appropriate to use the 
term 'nationalism', and that it takes on a real interpretative 
value.
The socio-psychological factors were more complex and 
heterogeneous, the most prominent among them being the feeling 
that the existence o f the emerging nation was endangered by the 
loss of its language. This was a sentiment that had survived from
45 E. J. HOBSBAWM, Nations and Nationalism since 1789, (Cambridge, 




























































































Phase B, where it had been well-founded, and had then been 
carried on into the mass movement, where it became a fiction or 
myth. Both intellectuals and politicians continued to believe that 
their language would become extinct, unless they paid careful 
heed to linguistic demands.
This myth could only seem convincing to the broader public if it 
were combined with other psychological features. The most 
important of these seems to have been the fact that "contrastive 
self-identification" (J. Fishman), which for centuries had been a 
typical pattern of behaviour limited to the ruling classes, came to 
be something generally accepted by a growing number of the 
members of the emerging nation during the transition to 
Phase C46. Complementary to this development was the tendency 
of operational individuals to feel comfortable and satisfied in a 
community, if it was based on a common interest in language47, 
though this could obviously only be the codified, standardized 
one, as using a correct high language formed part of the self- 
image of educated participants in Phase C48. The emerging elite 
of the nation acquired prestige from the correct use of their 
literary language, and by exerting pressure on the co-members of 
the national movement to use this literary language, they were 
able to encourage a 'disciplinisation' o f the nation.
However, even when standardized, intellectualized and used by a 
part of the elites, the new language still had a lower status than 
the ruling state-language—Russian, German or later, Magyar. 
Given that the status of the national group was also determined 
by the prestige of its language, the protection and upgrading of 
this language likewise became a matter o f prestige49. This issue 
also involved the struggle to introduce the equality of languages
46 J. A. Fishm an , Language and Nationalism, p. 54.
47 G. STOKES, Cognition, p. 537.
48 P. BOURDIEU, Ce c\ue purler veut dire, p. 64 ff.




























































































into administration and public life, and in this situation, language 
therefore became "highly ideologized"50, which helps explain why 
the whole of the nationally mobilized population—and not just 
the emerging elites—accepted and supported the symbolic value 
of their language, as a pillar of the newly-formed ethno-national 
community51. This was still the decisive criterion for belonging to 
the group, and for distinguishing between "Us" and "Them". 
Simultaneously, language retained the highly emotional potential 
that it had possessed since Phase B: it could serve not only as an 
instrument of social communication, but also as an "outlet for 
intense feelings"52. It would, however, be an exaggeration to 
suppose that the symbolic significance of language generally 
prevailed over its actual use53.
Lastly but by no means least, language became a criterion of the 
equality o f all citizens under the conditions of a modern, 
constitutional civil society and capitalism. It was inherent in the 
principles of this modern society that each citizen should learn the 
standardized language and use its spoken version, thus 
suppressing the dialect form, at least in the public sphere54. Since 
the language of the newly-formed nation was standardized, 
intellectualized and even accepted by the state authorities, 
learning and using it was also understood as a specific form of 
expressing civil rights.
*  * *
50 J. A. FISHMAN, Language and Nationalism, p. 61.
51 J. A. ROSS, 'Language and the Mobilization of Ethnic Identity', in: 
H. Giles  and B. Sa in t-Jacq ues (eds.), Language, p. 10.
52 O. JESPERSEN, Mankind, Nation and Individual from a Linguistic 
Point o f View (Oslo, 1925), p. 5;-J. A. ARMSTRONG, Nations, p. 242.
53 E. J. HOBSBAWM, Nations, p. 116 ff.
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The aim of this paper has not been to present a general "theory" 
of the nation-forming process as a whole. It has instead concen­
trated on one particular and important problem: why was the 
significance of linguistic demands so "disproportionately" high in 
most European national movements? Our explanation has sug­
gested that linguistic demands and their success cannot simply be 
interpreted as a result of the voluntaristic activities of a small 
group of ambitious intellectuals. Even if these individual factors 
cannot be ignored, the extraordinary appeal of the linguistic pro­
gramme was founded in deep-rooted transformations in society 
and mentalities.
Comparative research on the empirical data has shown that the 
primacy of linguistic demands was not a general feature of all 
national movements, even if it was characteristic of the majority. 
The primacy of linguistic demands in Phase B correlated with the 
social structure of the non-dominant ethnic group at the given 
stage of social and economic development. This correlation can be 
summarized in two sentences:
1. —Where the social structure was obviously incomplete, the
programme of the national movement was dominated by 
linguistic and cultural demands, while the political 
programme was formulated later, during Phase C.
2. —Where the social structure of non-dominant ethnic groups
included members of the ruling classes when on the 
threshold of its Phase B, the national movement's 
programme consisted of predominantly political goals, 
accompanied by social and linguistic ones.
In other words: the importance o f linguistic demands was 
inversely proportional to the participation of ruling classes in the 
B Phase o f national movements.
This was not an accidental correlation, but a causal one. Under 
given social circumstances, the nascent national movement had 
no alternative other than to emphasize linguistic demands during 
its Phase B. For important social and psychological reasons, the 




























































































in the national movement, and later also influenced the political 
programme that emerged during Phase C.
The choice of a linguistic programme and linguistically defined 
nation was the response of a more or less peripheral popula­
tion—the non-dominant ethnic group—to the challenge of mo­
dernization. In the general crisis of legitimacy and the feudal 
system, educated members of this group began to sense their 
inferiority because of their linguistic difference. Their success— 
the acceptance of their message by the general population—was 
primarily conditioned by factors other than just linguistic and 
cultural ones: above all, the structure of social communication 
and vertical mobility, and the intensity of nationally significant 
conflicts o f interest. In this "linguistic" type of national move­
ment, language played a substitutional role in expressing na­
tionally significant conflicts of interest.
This paper steers clear of the temptation of defining the nation by 
language, or of constructing a monocausal linguistic explanation 
for the success of national movements. Independent of agreement 
or disagreement with the explanation presented here, it cannot be 
disputed that language played an important role as a factor in the 
foundation of national consciousness and national traditions, nor 
that it ranked very high in the system of values of the majority of 
national movements. It became a symbolic expression of strate­
gies of exclusion. In comparing the emergence of national and 
regional identities, it can be seen that the role played by language 
related more specifically to the national identity, and can be re­
garded as one of the features which distinguished between these 
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